This paper examines the effect of increased market concentration of the banking industry caused by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) on the availability of finance for small firms engaged in research and development (R&D). I measure the financing decisions of these small firms using a balanced panel of Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) applications. Using difference-in-differences, I find IBBEA decreased the supply of finance for small R&D firms. This effect is larger for late adopters of IBBEA, which tended to be states with stronger small banking sectors pre-IBBEA. JEL Classification Codes: G21, G28, G39, O30
Introduction
This paper examines how the deregulation and subsequent consolidation of the U.S. banking industry affected financing for small firms engaged in research and development (R&D). Because technological development drives economic growth (Solow, 1957) , and because small firms are a significant driver of innovation (Acs and Audretsch, 1987) With a negative binomial model and difference-in-differences, I estimate the effect of IBBEA on SBIR applications with a balanced panel of state-year SBIR application counts. I find IBBEA increased SBIR applications between 10 to 50 percent. This effect is present for all states, but I find larger effects for states that adopted IBBEA later. Later adopters of IBBEA had stronger small banking sectors, more potential targets for interstate bank mergers, and the potential to have a larger change in banking structure due to the deregulation caused by IBBEA (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999) .
The key identification assumption for relating changes in SBIR applications to implications about small R&D firm finance is that SBIR awards and bank finance are substitutes. Under this assumption, if IBBEA made it more difficult for firms to secure funding for R&D projects, then firms should have sought an alternative source of funding in SBIR awards and we should observe an increase in SBIR applications due to IBBEA.
Evidence on the financing decisions of small R&D firms supports the idea that these firms view SBIR finance and all other sources of finance as substitutes. Combining SBIR grants with funding from other sources imposes costs on the firm and restricts the firm's use of its inventions. The imposed costs include SBIR application time and annual reporting requirements. 2 In addition, as a condition of funding research with an SBIR grant, the firm must disclose all invention(s) that come from the grant to the government and provide the government a license to use the disclosed invention(s). If the firm patents or licenses technology funded by SBIR, then the firm must submit an annual utilization report on the technology to the government. The government may also force the firm to grant licenses to other firms when the government deems licensing to be in the public interest (National Institutes of Health, 1995) . For SBIR award winning firms, Wallsten (2000) estimates an elasticity of substitution between SBIR award dollars and all other sources of funding as negative 0.82, indicating nearly dollar-for-dollar substitution between SBIR awards and other sources of finance for R&D.
Assuming bank finance and SBIR are substitutes, my estimated 10 to 50 percent increase in SBIR applications implies that IBBEA diminished bank finance for small R&D firms. Because I measure changes in finance with SBIR applications, as the balance sheet data on small R&D firms are unavailable, I cannot say exactly how much the supply of finance changed because of banking consolidation. However, with some assumptions, a rough calculation suggests that IBBEA decreased the supply of finance for small R&D firms in FY 1999 between 138 -508 million dollars. 3 In FY 1999 the budget for SBIR was $1.25 billion. The total value of SBIR finance to the IBBEA-induced applicants should be 82 percent of the value of lost bank fiance, using the elasticity of substitution from Wallsten (2000) (BEA, 2011). 3 fact that their award chances changed because of banking consolidation and (2) firms that were induced into applying for SBIR subsequent to IBBEA had an equal expected value of an SBIR application as a firm that would have applied without IBBEA. Because the estimates indicate that SBIR applications increased 10 to 50 percent, the lower bound on the change in finance should be My panel of state-year SBIR application counts is a data set that offers three advantages for this study. First, because the data set comes from administrative records, it is free of the selfreporting bias present in survey data. 4 Second, the data set is a balanced panel of SBIR application counts that is free of the survivorship bias usually present in bank or firm-level data. Third, the panel of SBIR application counts represents both public and private companies as opposed to just public companies (for example, companies in Compustat). This last advantage allows an analysis of small private companies, which are important to the conduct of R&D and for which little data are available. Previous research on banking deregulation looks at the effect of deregulation on the average small firm or the effect on lending for small firms at the state level, finding mixed results on how deregulation affected the supply of credit (Jayaratne and Wolken, 1999; Vera and Onji, 2010) . To my knowledge, this paper is the first that examines the effects of IBBEA specifically on small, private R&D firms.
Institutional Details of IBBEA and SBIR
This section reviews IBBEA and SBIR. I discuss how IBBEA led to the consolidation of the banking industry. For SBIR, I describe how the program is structured and present summary statistics of small R&D firms that are eligible for SBIR. 4 See, for example, Berger and Udell (1995) and Peek and Rosengren (1996) (Kane, 1996; Johnson and Rice, 2008) . Texas and Montana initially opted out, although both states later opted in. Table 1 shows the initial opt-in dates for each state. Subject to certain conditions, IBBEA allowed several new types of banking activity: (1) interstate bank acquisitions, (2) interstate agency operations, (3) interstate branching, and (4) de novo branching (Johnson and Rice, 2008) .
IBBEA changed the structure of the banking industry. Prior to IBBEA, in 1994 there were only 62 out-of-state bank branches -less than 1 percent of the total number of branches. With the removal of the restrictions on interstate branching, by 1999 there were more than 10,000 out-ofstate bank branches -approximately 20 percent of the total number of bank branches (Johnson and Rice, 2008) .
In addition to allowing interstate bank branches, IBBEA increased interstate bank mergers, which contributed to the consolidation of the banking industry documented in Figure 1 . Figure   2 plots interstate bank mergers during the 1990s and shows a significant increase in interstate mergers subsequent to IBBEA.
IBBEA fueled research on the relationship between banking consolidation, deregulation, and finance. 5 This research may have been encouraged by suspicions that IBBEA was detrimental for small firm finance, which was also a chief concern in Congress when IBBEA was debated (U.S.
Congress, 1993).
5 Examples include Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell (1998); Cole and Walraven (1998) ; Peek and Rosengren (1998) ; Strahan and Weston (1998) ; Jayaratne and Wolken (1999) ; Craig and Hardee (2007) ; Rice and Strahan (2010) ; Vera and Onji (2010); and Cornaggia, Mao, Tian, and Wolfe (2015) . Column (1) shows that in 1992, the average small R&D firm had 12 workers, almost a quarter million dollars in payroll, and more than $1.6 million in sales. Importantly for this paper, 38.9 percent of these firms applied for a loan from 1993 to 1994 and, on average, were approved for more than half a million dollars. These data show that loans are an important source of finance for these firms. Firms that also applied for venture capital were larger, on average, than those that did not. In addition, firms that applied for venture capital also secured loans as a source of finance.
Agencies divide their SBIR awards into either two or three phases. A Phase I award is for a firm to explore the technical and commercial feasibility of the R&D project. If the results of the Phase I project are promising, the firm may be invited to apply for a Phase II award to further develop and commercialize the idea. Firms cannot undertake a Phase II project without first completing Phase I. Some agencies also have a Phase III program, which involves partnering the firm with a collaborator; this phase does not provide additional government SBIR money.
For the empirical analysis, I use the total state by FY SBIR Phase I applications for the agencies with the largest SBIR budgets: the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Heath and Human Services; the National Aviation and Space Administration (NASA); and the National Science Foundation (NSF). These five agencies compose more than 96 percent of the SBIR budget in each FY (National Science Board, 2008) . I use Phase I applications as the dependent variable because these give the strongest indicator of the effort small R&D firms expend to seek external finance. 9 Phase II and Phase III applications represent a mixture of firm effort and agency politics, as they are conditional on good progress in earlier SBIR phase(s) and can require an invitation by the SBIR agency to even apply.
Model and Data

Model
Two features of IBBEA's deregulation are important for this study. First, the removal of banking restrictions consolidated the banking industry and potentially affected the cost of credit (Cole and Walraven, 1998; Peek and Rosengren, 1998; Strahan and Weston, 1998; Jayaratne and Wolken, 9 Unfortunately, I do not observe the total dollar amount applied for, only the application count. 7 1999; Craig and Hardee, 2007; Rice and Strahan, 2010; Vera and Onji, 2010) . Second, because there is between-state variation in deregulation dates, I can identify the effect of IBBEA on small R&D firm finance in a treatment-control setup.
Because the dependent variable, SBIR applications, is a count variable, I estimate a negative binomial model Trivedi, 1998, 2005) . The negative binomial model is
where
In equations (1) to (5), i is a state, t is the FY, exp(•) is the exponential function, E(•) is the expectations operator, Var(•) is the variance, X is a matrix of covariates, and α, β and δ are parameters to be estimated.
In addition to the fact that the negative binomial model only predicts non-negative outcomes, the negative binomial model's estimated marginal effects account for heterogeneous state sizes.
Differentiating the conditional mean in equation (4) with respect to a single covariate x j , the expected marginal effect for y with respect to x j is
which depends on the parameter for covariate x j , β j , the entire matrix of covariates X, and their associated parameters β through the term exp(X β ). 10
Policy Variable
A standard policy variable is an indicator for post-deregulation that assumes a uniform effect of deregulation over time. I instead construct the policy variable to allow for time-varying effects of deregulation.
I divide states into three cohorts, one for each FY from the passage of IBBEA to the IBBEA trigger date: (1) Formally, let D t be a year dummy for FY t and D i,τ be a dummy for state i if it deregulated in FY τ. The conditional mean for state i in FY t with the policy variable is:
In equation (7), ζ t represents the effect of IBBEA on SBIR applications in FY t for the group of states that deregulated by FY 1995, η t represents the effect of IBBEA on SBIR applications in FY t for the group of states that deregulated in FY 1996, and θ t represents the effect of IBBEA on SBIR applications in FY t for the group of states that deregulated in FY 1997.
I model the policy variable using equation (7) instead of the standard policy indicator variable to be completely flexible for allowing time-varying effects of IBBEA by deregulation cohort.
There are at least three reasons to expect that IBBEA had different effects both over time and by deregulation cohort. One reason is that when states deregulated, it affected the banking industry in states that had already deregulated. For example, when states deregulated in 1995, banks could conduct interstate mergers but only between banks in the deregulated states. When the next wave of states deregulated in 1996, the banks in these states could merge with other banks in the newly deregulated states and also with banks in states that were already deregulated. Similarly, states that were already deregulated had a new influx of banks with which they could merge. Therefore, each new wave of deregulation affected the banking industry in both the newly deregulated states and the states that had already deregulated, which implies that IBBEA had time-varying effects and makes the standard indicator policy variable unsatisfactory.
A second reason to expect different effects of IBBEA by deregulation cohort is that later adopters of IBBEA had stronger small banking sectors than early adopters (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999). Therefore, for later adopters there was a potential for a greater amount of change post-IBBEA.
A third reason is a timing and learning story. Suppose that when the first wave of deregulation passed in 1995, banks were unfamiliar with the procedures needed to instigate the now-legal mergers. Therefore, some banks in the states that deregulated in 1995 may have delayed merging.
However, by 1997, banks may have been familiar with these procedural hurdles and could execute mergers more quickly than when IBBEA was first passed. In this scenario, we can expect the effect of deregulation on market concentration to vary over time. I model IBBEA's time-varying effect as the flexible form in equation (7) to be completely agnostic on the mechanism behind changes in banking concentration. 12 The key identification assumption relating changes in SBIR applications caused by IBBEA to IBBEA's effect on small R&D firm finance is that SBIR applications and bank finance are substitutes (Wallsten, 2000) . Therefore, if we observe an increase in SBIR applications, then the implication is that IBBEA decreased the supply of bank finance. In this situation, firms switched from bank finance to trying to receive an SBIR award, which increased SBIR applications. The opposite holds for a decrease in SBIR applications.
Dependent Variable and Controls
To identify the effect of IBBEA on SBIR application rates, I use a variety of additional covariates that control for other factors that can influence a state's SBIR applications. I use state fixed effects to remove time-invariant characteristics of states that could affect SBIR applications. I also include state-specific time trends and time dummies to control for the trend of SBIR applications prior to IBBEA.
I remove the effects of the business cycle on SBIR applications using gross state product from the BEA (BEA, 2011). R&D expenditures are correlated with the business cycle, which implies that the financing patterns for R&D, including SBIR applications, should also be correlated with the business cycle regardless of the state of banking deregulation (Barlevy, 2007; Chang, 2013 The propensity for a firm to seek funding may also be a function of other state-specific factors. For example, if a state adopts policies that are more friendly to innovative activities, then it could alter the SBIR application rate for that state. Alternatively, through the fertile technology hypothesis, if a large amount of innovation occurs in a particular state, then it can create additional 14 To determine the industry composition of SBIR-award-winning firms, I use data on SBIR award winners from the SBA's TECH-Net database (SBA, 2010) . The database records details on SBIR awards: characteristics of winning firms, the abstracts of the SBIR proposals, amount of the award, etc. I take a random sample of 1000 SBIR awards from FY 1990 to FY 2000, divided evenly over each of the five largest SBIR agencies by budget, and use TECHNet's information to assign each award-winning firm to either one or two NAICS codes. I match the sampled firms from TECH-Net to publicly available databases that contain information on firms and their product lines (Dun and Bradstreet, 2010; Federal Government Bid Intelligence Company, 2011; Gale Group, 2010) as well as crosscheck the information from these databases against available public reports, company websites, published articles, and patent applications to accurately assign the SBIR awardees to NAICS codes.opportunities for innovative activities, which would alter the SBIR application rate through a channel other than IBBEA (Kortum and Lerner, 1998) . I add three controls to the model to proxy for the innovative climate in a state. Firms may also decide to apply for SBIR as a function of agency-specific investment in the state. For example, suppose the Department of Defense increases its R&D funding in Alabama.
Firms in Alabama would then begin to acquire knowledge of and familiarity with the Department of Defense's technological and R&D demands. This familiarity could induce firms in the state to apply for SBIR awards, as they would have garnered additional information on the department or have revised estimates of the expected value of an SBIR award. To control for agency-specific investment, I add total R&D obligations for U.S. performers by the five SBIR agencies into the model. Data on R&D obligations come from the NSF's WebCASPAR database (National Science 17 Other examples of research into R&D tax incentives include Chang (2014) and Guceri and Liu (2015) . 18 To determine which types of patents to include in this measure, I sample the largest SBIR agency's (Department of Defense) award winners from the SBA Tech-Net Database. I present results where the patent count control variable includes total patent applications for the following two-digit Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) technology categories: gas (13), communications (21) , computer hardware and software (22), computer peripherals (23), information storage (24), electrical devices (41), electrical lighting (42), measuring and testing (43), nuclear and x-rays (44), power systems (45), semiconductor devices (46), miscellaneous electronics (49), materials processing and handling (51), metalworking (52), motors (53), optics (54), transportation (55), miscellaneous mechanical (59), and heating (66). I also check the results using all patent applications, and the results are nearly identical. Foundation, 2010b). Table 4 presents the estimated average marginal effects from the baseline model. 20 Column (1) presents a parsimonious specification with only aggregate time dummies, state time trends, and state fixed effects. The marginal effects reported indicate the average change in SBIR applications by cohort for each FY subsequent to deregulation relative to the pre-IBBEA period. Column (2) presents the same specification as column (1) percent increase over the pre-IBBEA period. Adding additional state controls in column (3) yields similar effects for all IBBEA cohorts. Column (4) displays the results of column (3) in percent terms. 21 From Table 4 , for almost all treatment periods, the model indicates that IBBEA increased SBIR applications. Under the assumption of constant substitutability between bank finance and SBIR awards, this increase in applications implies IBBEA decreased the supply of bank finance for small R&D firms. In addition, for all cohorts this decrease in finance is exacerbated over time.
For the FY 1995 cohort, immediately after deregulation (FY 1996) there is a small effect (6.71 percent) of IBBEA on SBIR applications. However, the estimates for four years after deregulation (FY 1999) indicate a 25.2 percent increase in SBIR applications. A similar upward trend in applications holds for the FY 1996 and FY 1997 cohorts, implying a downward trend in the 19 I also experiment with specifications that include the state-level unemployment rate and the state-level unemployment rate interacted with the fed funds rate, which is a covariate that could capture heterogeneous effects of monetary policy on SBIR applications. These specifications give similar results, and I omit them for brevity. 20 For state i's regressor j, x i, j , the average marginal effect is
, where N is the total number of states. 21 Removing the time effects generates estimates close to zero for all cohort years. The time dummies and state time trends account for the pre-IBBEA trend in SBIR applications. supply of finance. 22 For the FY 1995 and FY 1996 cohorts, the effect of IBBEA on SBIR applications is statistically significant at the 5 percent level in 1999; for the FY 1997 cohort the effect is significant in 1998. Late adopters of IBBEA had stronger small banking sectors, more possible targets for interstate bank mergers, and the potential to have a larger change in banking structure subsequent to deregulation (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999) . One possible explanation for the upward trend in SBIR applications is the successive waves of consolidation caused by IBBEA, which caused steadily increasing market concentration.
Of the control variables in Table 4 , patent counts and agency R&D obligations are individually significant, and the joint F-test of all control variables indicates the controls are jointly significant.
In unreported specifications that include additional lags of the control variables or differences of the controls, the effect of IBBEA on SBIR applications is similar to the baseline. 23 The tendency for SBIR applications to rise from FY 1997 to FY 1999 corresponds with the large increase in market concentration of the commercial banking sector, suggesting the increased concentration of the banking industry decreased small firm finance for R&D. The estimation is consistent with the hypothesis that the relationship lending channel of small banks is more important than the geographic diversification potential of large banks for small R&D firm financing. 24 
Robustness Checks
In this section, I present additional robustness checks on the main results from section 4. 22 Weighting states by gross state product still shows an upward trend in applications for all cohorts. The weighted estimates are similar to the unweighted estimates for the FY 1995 and FY 1996 cohorts. For the FY 1997 cohort, the weighted estimates are about half of the unweighted estimates. For all cohorts, the coefficients for IBBEA are statistically significant at standard levels. 23 To check for stationarity of covariates, I run the Harris and Tzavalis (1999) small-T adjusted panel unit root test. The test indicates that academic R&D, the user cost of R&D, patent count, gross state product, and the establishment count are non-stationary. To address the potential effect of non-stationary covariates on my results, I conduct two exercises: (1) I reestimate the model with only the stationary covariates from the baseline specification, and (2) I firstdifference the non-stationary covariates and reestimate the model with these differenced covariates (the Harris and Tzavalis (1999) test indicates that all of the first-differenced covariates are stationary). In both of these specifications, the estimates of the effect of IBBEA on SBIR applications are similar to the baseline, with IBBEA increasing SBIR applications by 22 to 36 percent, depending on the deregulation cohort.
Policy Variable Timing
The first robustness check I consider is the timing of the policy variable. The policy variable in section 4 models IBBEA as taking effect the year after deregulation. However, banks could potentially respond to deregulation either faster or slower than with a one year lag. Therefore, I
adjust the timing of the policy variable to start either in the year IBBEA was passed or two years after, as opposed to one year after. Table 5 shows the results for changing the timing of the policy variable. Columns (1) and (2) show the results of modeling IBBEA as having an effect the year it was passed. Columns (3) and (4) model IBBEA's effect as two years after it was passed. Columns (1) and (3) report the average marginal effect in levels, and columns (2) and (4) report the effects of columns (1) and (3) in percents. 25 The treatment patterns when shifting the timing of the policy variable in Table 5 are similar to the baseline model in Table 4 . From columns (1) and (2) Changing the treatment to have an effect two years after deregulation (columns 3 and 4) attenuates the estimated increases in SBIR applications, but the point estimates are generally still positive and increase with time as in the previous specifications. In FY 1999, relative to the baseline (Table 4 , column 4), the estimated increase in SBIR applications due to IBBEA disappears for the FY 1995 cohort, changes from a 30.5 percent increase to a 17.4 percent increase for the FY 1996 cohort, and changes from a 37.7 percent increase to a 23.1 percent increase for the FY 1997 cohort.
Specific States
An additional concern is whether certain states drive the results in Table 4 . Specifically, I consider North Dakota (ND), Montana (MT), and Texas (TX) by individually excluding each of these states from the estimation. Table 6 shows the results. Column (1) presents the baseline results (Table 4 Table 4 without North Dakota, which yields similar results as shown in Table 6 , column (2). To do so, I individually exclude Montana and Texas from the estimation. If, for example, Montana experienced a shock to SBIR applications but Texas did not, then the estimates using just
Montana as a control group should be different than when using just Texas as a control group and both estimates should be different than when using both states as a control group, as in Table 4 .
Similarly, I can rule out a state-specific shock driving the results when the estimates using either Montana or Texas or both Montana and Texas are all similar.
When sequentially excluding the control states, the results are similar to using both control states. IBBEA continues to increase SBIR applications and decrease the supply of finance for small R&D firms. Using just Texas as a control state in column (4) generates larger estimates of this effect than either using both Montana and Texas or just Montana, but all of the qualitative results from the baseline model continue to hold.
Conclusion
The deregulation of interstate bank branching and relaxed restrictions on interstate bank mergers by IBBEA increased market concentration in the U.S. banking industry. This paper uses a balanced panel to investigate how the increase in market concentration by IBBEA affected the supply of finance for small R&D firms. The applicants to SBIR are small R&D firms, both private and public.
Economic theory gives an ambiguous prediction of the effect of banking consolidation on small firm financing. Large banks benefit from geographic diversification. Because large banks are involved in multiple, geographically distinct product markets, they are able to distribute risk over different regions and shield themselves against adverse regional capital or business shocks (Peek and Rosengren, 1996) . The diversification potential of large banks gives them an advantage over small banks when offering financing terms for small R&D firms.
However, when trying to obtain a source of finance, the firm will generally have superior information about the value of the firm relative to a prospective financier. This information disparity is particularly true of small R&D firms, which have little collateral or other hard information to signal their worth to financiers. Small banks, by forming long-term relationships with and collecting soft information on clients (for example, a firm owner's work ethic), can reduce informational asymmetries and therefore offer superior financing terms to large banks, which rely on transaction lending (for example, credit histories) to make investment decisions (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Stein, 2002) . I find that IBBEA decreased the supply of finance for small R&D firms. This result implies that the relationship lending channel of small banks, in which small banks develop long-term relationships with potential clients to overcome information asymmetries associated with finance, might be more important than the geographic diversity advantage of large banks for small R&D firm finance (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Peek and Rosengren, 1996) .
Government support for R&D is justified by the presence of market failures for R&D. These market failures stem from at least two characteristics of R&D: (1) the social return to R&D is higher than the private return to R&D, as innovators are unable to capture profits from the positive spillovers associated with their inventions (Griliches, 1992; Samuelson, 1954) , and (2) asymmetric information between firms and potential financiers complicates the financing of R&D and gives rise to market failures due to moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Arrow, 1962) . This paper suggests banking consolidation worsened these market failures. This figure measures market concentration using data from the first quarter of each FY. Source: Call Reports, Stein, 1995, 2000; Den Haan, Sumner, and Yamashiro, 2002; Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2011) . 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Interstate Mergers
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Pre-IBBEA IBBEA Phase-In Post-IBBEA Source: Vera and Onji (2010). Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. *, **, ***: significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 31 23.1 (30.9)*** (14.8)*** (11.2)*** (5.41)*** Average marginal effects reported. Columns (1) and (3) report the effect in levels ( dy dx ). Columns (2) and (4) report the effects of columns (1) and (3) as semielasticities converted to percents ( dy/y dx × 100%). Number of observations is 510. All regressions include control variables from Table  4 , aggregate time dummies, state time trends, and state time-invariant effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. *, **, ***: significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. and employee count are in thousands. For excluded states, "ND" = North Dakota, "MT" = Montana, and "TX" = Texas. Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. *, **, ***: significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 33
